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Introduction

§

everal participants in the conference on computer network attack held at
the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, in June 1999 addressed the issue ofwhether serious consideration should be given in the near future to negotiating international agreements to regulate information warfare.
The consensus appeared to be that it would be useful to expand current efforts to
improve international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting computer
crimes and "cyber-terrorism," but that it would be premature anytime in the
near future to attempt any further prohibition or regulation ofState action in the
broad area of information warfare. I generally share those views. This chapter
will discuss a number of possibilities for international agreements on information warfare, indicate the eJl..1:ent ofdeclared support for negotiations intended to
produce such agreements, and venture an opinion on their potential utility.
Some observers have said that the few calls already heard for a treaty banning
information warfare come primarily from "have-not" nations that fervendy desire to keep the "haves" from reaping any advantage from the information warfare capabilities they have developed by their effort and investment. Others say
that new agreements are necessary to enhance the international cooperation that
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is essential to effective suppression of malicious interference with information
systems that are essential to development, prosperity, international peace and security, and human health and safety. Still others say that new information technologies raise novel international legal issues that would be better resolved by
negotiating a definitive international agreement than through the slow and uncertain process by which customary international law develops. Others reply
that we are not yet smart enough to sit down and create international law on
these new issues, and that the gradual accumulation ofpractice and precedent offers the best process for applying existing international law to these new issues in
cyberspace. I boldly take the position that each of these views is correct-in part
and on some subjects.
For the purposes of this chapter, I intend to set aside discussion ofa number of
military missions that are often considered to be elements of information warfare. These are the physical destruction of information systems by traditional
military means, electronic warfare (e.g., 'Jamming" of radio and radar signals),
military deception, and operations security. These traditional military missions
have been conducted for a long time over a wide spectrum ofmilitary operations
from peace to war, and the application ofinternational law to them is reasonably
well settled. I also intend to set aside discussion ofdirected energy weapons such
as high-energy radio, microwave, and electro-magnetic pulse devices. The
technology of these devices is relatively new, but their employment and effects
are likely to be so similar to those of traditional weapons that established principles of international law concerning the use of force and the law of armed conflict can be applied to them with great confidence.
Psychological operations have also been a traditional military mission, but
new technologies such as the broadcasting of radio and television signals from
aircraft and satellites, worldwide access to the Internet, and greatly improved capabilities to create false images and messages give "psyops" unprecedented reach
and power. .fu we shall see, there already have been a few isolated calls for new
international controls over these new capabilities for spreading "propaganda."
The newest element of information warfare, and the one currently dra\ving
the most attention, is computer network attack, or CNA. CNA is conducted by
sending electronic messages from one computer to another through some connecting medium or network, such as radio or the Internet, or by direct input
by a user of the target computer system. The most common forms ofCNA are:
(1) overloading an adversary's web pages or e-mail systems \vith so much input
that they cannot function properly; (2) tricking an authorized user into inputting
malicious logic, as by sending an e-mail message with a virus or a worm in an attached file; and (3) obtaining unauthorized access to an adversary's computer
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system. Unauthorized access may be obtained by exploiting a security weakness
in the target's operating system, by unauthorized use of a genuine user identification and password, or by other means. Even if an intruder does no apparent
harm, the mere fact that an intruder has gained unauthorized access renders the
system and its contents suspect, since an intruder could have altered stored data,
changed the operating system, or introduced malicious logic such as a virus,
worm, or logic bomb. An intruder may even damage the system to the point
where it becomes unusable. The remainder of this chapter will focus primarily
on the question of whether it would be desirable to negotiate international
agreements to prohibit or regulate CNA.
At this point in history, there are a number of "revealed truths" concerning
CNA that make it different from prior methods and means ofconducting hostilities. I list them here as common points of departure; the reader can find a fuller
discussion of them in the other contributions to this volume:
• The more a nation relies on sophisticated information systems, the more
vulnerable it is to interference with them;
• Geography has ceased to be relevant to the security ofinformation systems
that are connected to the Internet or that are accessible by radio;
• The worldwide use of comparable equipment, operating systems, and
software greatly facilitates CNA;
• Information technologies change rapidly;
• Most advances in information technology are developed by individuals or
companies for commercial purposes;
• Developing at least some capability to interfere with other nations'
information systems is relatively cheap and easy, compared to other
modem weapons systems, and the necessary expertise and equipment are
widely available;
• CNA "offense" currently seems to be dominant over CNA "defense," but
the balance between them might change quickly and dramatically;
• In most cases it is difficult to locate and identify computer intruders, to
discover their motive and intent, and to determine whether their acts are
attributable to State sponsors; and
• Because many "dual-use" information infrastructures whose support to
military operations makes them legitimate military targets are also used for
noncombatant purposes, interference with them may endanger the safety
of persons and property protected by the law of war from deliberate attack
and from disproportionate collateral damage.
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Calls For International Agreements
Public calls by governments for new international agreements on information
warfare consist primarily of: (1) initiatives by the United States and by certain
European and other American nations to promote better international cooperation in investigating and prosecuting computer crimes and terrorism; and (2) a
campaign by Russia in United Nations channels for multilateral arms control
negotiations to protect international "information security."
International cooperation in investigating and prosecuting computer crimes
has sometimes proven to be quite effective even in the absence of new agreements and working arrangements specifically tailored to this new category ofoffenses. For example, in 1987 West German authorities relied on the authority
provided by existing German law to trace the origin of over 200 intrusions into
US government computers to four German nationals who turned out to be
working for the KGB.l In far too many cases, however, effective international
cooperation in investigating computer offenses has been frustrated by the unwillingness of the requested State to cooperate, its lack of domestic legal authority to investigate and punish computer offenses, the absence of established
procedures and points ofcontact, and problems arising from extradition treaties.
In an effort to address such problems, in December 1997 the United States Attorney General hosted a meeting of the Group of Eight (G-8) Justice and Interior
Ministers to discuss international cooperation in the investigation and prosecution
of computer intrusions and other high-tech crimes.2 Since this meeting, a number
of international working groups have devoted considerable effort to modernizing
the G-8 nations' domestic criminal laws and to improving international agreements
and arrangements providing for mutual legal assistance and e}"1:radition in cases involving computer offenses. This work has also generated a project in the Council of
Europe, which the United States has assisted, to draft an international convention on
"cyber-crime." The United States has also undertaken similar initiatives in the Organization of American States and at the United Nations. Significant progress has
been made, but there is still an enormous amount of work to be done in this area.
For example, while several European nations have made significant reforms in their
domestic computer crime laws and the state of procedures for international assistance in investigating computer offenses has gready improved between various nations, Russia has essentially stonewalled all requests for cooperation in investigating
several thousand intrusions into US military computer systems in early 1999 that apparendy originated in Russian territory.3
In addition, these efforts have focused on computer offenses committed by
individuals that can be characterized as crimes or terrorism. They are not direcdy
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relevant to State action. Somewhat ironically, the only nation that has made a
prominent effort to address the use ofcomputer network attack by States against
other States has been Russia. In October 1998, Russian Federation Ambassador
Vasily Sidorovmade a statement before the UN General Assembly's Committee
on Disarmament and International Security to the effect that Russia is alarmed
by the serious threats to international peace and security raised by developments
in information technology, and that it is urgent to take preventive measures by
establishing international principles on the use of information technology and
possibly an international monitoring and control regime. 4 Russia also tabled a
resolution that called for Member States to ex-press their views on the creation of
"international legal regimes to prohibit the development, production or use of
particularly dangerous forms ofinformation weapons" and the establishment of
"an international system (centre) for monitoring threats pertaining to the security of global information and telecommunications systems."5
No significant support was expressed by other nations for the Russian proposal. Instead, on December 4, 1998, the General Assembly adopted without a
vote a greatly watered-down resolution that called on Member States to "promote at multilateral levels the consideration of existing and potential threats in
the field ofinformation security," invited all Member States to inform the Secretary
General of their views on the subject, requested the Secretary-General to submit a report to the General Assembly in its 1999 session, and included in the
provisional agenda for its next session the topic, "Developments in the field of
information and telecommunications in the context ofinternational security."6
Undeterred, Russia has continued to pursue its proposal for an "international
legal regime" on "information weapons." In its submission ofviews to the Secretary General as invited by the General Assembly resolution, Russia declared
that "information weapons" can have" devastating consequences comparable to
the effect of weapons of mass destruction," called for the General Assembly to
pass "resolutions on the question ofinfomi.ation security with a view to reducing the threat of the use of information for terrorist, criminal or military purposes," and proposed the development of a code of conduct for States
concerning international information security that would ultimately be incorporated into a multilateral international legal instrument?
The United States also submitted its views, which generally were that the international community should give priority to developing measures to deal with
criminal or terrorist misuse of information technology, and that "it would be
premature to try to formulate overarching principles pertaining to information
security in all its aspects."8
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Only eight other nations-Australia, Belarus, Brunei, Cuba, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom-submitted written views to the Secretary General. Of these, only Belarus and Cuba expressed support for negotiations to restrict information warfare. The Secretary General offered no opinion.
In August 1999, the United Nations Department ofDisarmament Affairs and
the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) hosted a
conference in Geneva, Switzerland on the topic: "Developments in the Field of
Information and Telecommunications and Their Impact on International Security." Russia used the forum to promote its proposals for international legal restrictions on information warfare, but it was unable to gamer significant support
for doing more than continuing to study the problem. 9
Nevertheless, the current paucity of enthusiasm for negotiating an international agreement restricting information warfare may not last forever. In the past
twenty years, the international community has negotiated multilateral treaties
restricting such weapons as chemical weapons, blinding lasers, incendiaries,
weapons designed to wound with undetectable fragments, and antipersonnel
landmines. 10 It might take only a few spectacular incidents involving CNA to
provoke serious interest in placing international legal restrictions upon "information weapons."

Subjects For Possible Agreements
Treaties to suppress private misconduct.
1. Suppression of "cyber-crime." As indicated above, efforts are already under
way in the G-8, the Council of Europe, the Organization of American States,
and the United Nations to improve domestic criminal legislation, international
cooperation in investigations and prosecutions, and extradition treaties in order
to more effectively investigate and punish cross-border computer crimes. The
US and British submissions of views' mentioned above recommended that the
United Nations give this area top priority in its activities concerning information
security.
ASSESSMENT: This topic is a logical candidate for priority consideration,
since both the nature of the problem of cross-border computer crime and the required remedial steps are reasonably well understood, and since national security
issues are not directly implicated. (It should be noted, however, that effective international cooperation in tracing computer network attacks to their origin
would also greatly expedite attribution of State-sponsored CNA.) That is not to
say that the negotiation of the necessary international agreements will be easy,
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given the major differences that exist among domestic legal systems and the encroachment on traditional sovereignty principles that will be inescapable in creating legally binding obligations to assist with criminal investigations and
prosecutions, not to mention the proposals that are under consideration for reciprocal authorization of cross-border electronic tracing and monitoring.
2. Suppression of "cyber-terrorism." A "cyber-terrorism" agreement might well
adopt the common features of the existing multilateral treaties intended to combat such terrorist acts as the hijacking and sabotage ofaircraft, hostage taking, attacks on diplomats, terrorist bombing, and the seizure ofships on the high seas. 11
These common features are a recognition of universal or quasi-universal jurisdiction over individuals committing specified acts, an obligation upon each
Party to put into place severe domestic criminal penalties for such acts, and an
obligation to prosecute or extradite any person suspected of such acts who is
found in the territory of a Party.
ASSESSMENT: It may prove to be difficult to generate much interest in negotiating such an agreement until the international community experiences incidents in which "cyber-terrorism" causes death and destruction on the scale
experienced as the result of more traditional forms of terrorism. To date, the most
common form of cross-border CNA motivated by political reasons has consisted
of individuals defacing the target nation's websites, which is likely to strike most
people more as vandalism than as terrorism. Even the theft oflarge amounts of
money or the crippling of expensive information systems is unlikely to provoke
the same kind offear and loathing created by more traditional terrorist acts that direcdy threaten innocent human lives. It would probably take an incident in which
planes crash, trains collide, floods cause death and devastation, or a nuclear accident spreads radiation over the countryside before CNA would be taken seriously
as "cyber-terrorism." Another major problem would be reaching agreement on
definitions ofthe acts to be suppressed. It is certainly worth exploring the possibilities here, but rapid progress-or even moving the international community at
large to devote serious effort to negotiation ofa "cyber-terrorism" treaty--seems
unlikely in the near future. It may turn out that the most effective legal mechanism
for suppression of "cyber-terrorists" will be "cyber-crime" agreements, as discussed above, that would put into effect domestic computer crime laws and facilitate cross-border investigations and prosecutions.

Treaties to restrict state action.
1. Declarations ofgeneral legal principles. Perhaps the simplest approach to advancing the development ofinternational law on information security would be
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to negotiate a multilateral treaty that declares broad relevant principles of international law. An example ofsuch a document is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty,12
which declares, inter alia, that space is not subject to national appropriation or
territorial claims, that nations are obligated not to interfere with the space activities of other nations, that space objects remain under the jurisdiction and control
of their nation of registry, that nations bear international responsibility for their
space activities, and that established principles ofinternationallaw, including the
UN Charter, apply to space activities. Some candidate principles for a similar
declaration ofprinciples on information activities might be that nations must not
damage/disrupt/interfere with the information systems of other nations; that
such acts violate the sovereignty of the victim nation and threaten international
peace and security; and perhaps even that interference ,vith information systems
causing death, injury, widespread property damage, or serious damage to communications, public utilities, economic institutions, emergency services, or national security systems will be considered to be equivalent to an armed attack,
thereby authorizing the victim nation to employ the remedies provided under
international law to the victims of traditional armed attacks, including the use of
force in individual or collective self-defense.
ASSESSMENT: It will take some time for most nations to determine what
international legal principles concerning information warfare are likely to best
serve their long-term national interests. Even nations that already possess sophisticated information systems have litde confidence at this point that they can reliably forecast near-term technical developments that may drastically affect the
balance of information warfare capabilities and vulnerabilities. Those nations
that have even a minimum of capabilities to engage in information operations
must make a judgment as to whether their interests would be best served by
keeping open their options to interfere with other nation's information systems,
especially when they are engaged in an international armed conflict, or whether
their national interests would be best served by creating an international legal regime that broadly prohibits such interference.
The current domestic and international debate over "space control" may
present a useful analogy. As indicated above, the Outer Space Treaty declares the
general principle that nations will not interfere with the space activities of other
nations. However, its provisions recognizing that nations must conduct their
space activities in compliance with international law, including the UN Charter,
bring to bear the international law principles that force can be used in
self-defense and to execute mandates of the Security Council. Accordingly,
these widely-recognized legal authorizations for the use of force apply to space
activities in the same manner as they do in the air, at sea, and on land.
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Furthennore, since the Outer Space Treaty is silent as to its application during an
international anned conflict, we are left to rely on the general principles ofinternational law to detennine the extent to which its obligations may apply in wartime. 13 In these circumstances, there has been considerable activity in the UN
General Assembly and in the Conference on Disannament devoted to drafting a
multilateral agreement to prevent an "arms race in space." To date, however,
this activity has produced virtually nothing in the way of concrete results. 14
The continuing impasse over attempts to develop international legal measures
to prevent an "arms race in space" might be seen as a confrontation ofthe "haves"
versus the "have-nots," which might also be seen as the dynamic at work in the
impasse over proposals for complete nuclear disannament. On the other hand,
the impasse might also be seen as reflecting the reluctance of at least some of the
thirty or so space-capable nations to participate in fonnulating intemationallegal
principles concerning space control when they have yet to reach their own
judgments concerning where their own long-tenn national interests lie.
The analogy between space control and infonnation warfare is less than exact,
for several reasons. One is the fact that it is many orders of magnitude easier for a
nation to develop a significant infonnation warfare capability than it is to develop space control capabilities. This is clearly demonstrated by the computer
network attacks that have already been reported in connection with such conflicts as Kosovo and Chechnya, and in the continuing tensions between Taiwan
and mainland China. 1s The converse is also true--virtually every nation employs at least some automated infonnation systems, making them vulnerable to
CNA, while only about thirty nations conduct space activities. In these circumstances, it seems unlikely that very many nations will regard -themselves as
"non-players" in infonnation warfare. It seems equally unlikely that many of
them will come to finn conclusions anytime soon about how their own
long-tenn national interests might be affected by restricting CNA or other infonnation warfare activities. Accordingly, even a declaration of general legal
principles concerning infonnation warfare is likely to be beyond the grasp of the
international community for the foreseeable future.
2. Anlls Control Agreements. Another approach would be to negotiate agreements under which the parties would commit themselves not to develop, possess,
or transfer certain information warfare capabilities, or to use them in a manner that
is destabilizing to other arms control regimes or to crisis management systems.
ASSESSMENT: This approach is subject to the same caveat stated above,
which is that not many nations-if any-have figured out where their
long-tenn national interest lies in relation to infonnation warfare. It also suffers
from the great difficulty of defining exacdy what capabilities the parties would
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agree not to develop, possess, or transfer; from the apparent impossibility of
verification; from the €lct that governments have no monopoly over the development or use ofCNA capabilities; and from the fact that CNA capabilities and vulnerabilities change rapidly. The development of "hacking" tools is a worldwide
cottage industry, unlike nuclear weapons, tanks, artillery, submarines, ballistic
missiles, or warplanes. Powerful hacker tools are posted on the Internet for use by
all comers.16 Furthermore, many highly capable computer network attack capabilities spring direcdy from techniques and programs developed for legitimate
purposes. 17 For these reasons, it is difficult to envisage how an arms control-style
agreement could be negotiated anytime in the near future. In addition, any proposal for a nonproliferation agreement might well raise suspicions among the
developing nations that the "have" nations are engaged in a conspiracy to deny
the developing nations the benefits of highly capable information systems.
Strategic arms control agreements often contain provisions to preserve or expand transparency, such as obligations not to interfere with other parties' national technical means of verification. It may not be necessary to negotiate
separate agreements in order to extend the reach ofsuch agreements to ban electronic means of interference with national technical means of verification. At
most, an agreed interpretation by the parties should suffice. Another similar extension of arms control principles that might prove to be both useful and attainable would be an agreement that the parties will not employ information warfare
techniques in a manner that would interfere with each others' command and
control of strategic weapons or disrupt missile attack warning systems.
Another theme of arms control agreements has been to create new confidence-building procedures, as in the Open Skies Agreement. iS However, it is
difficult to imagine how a confidence-building agreement could be devised for
computer network attack capabilities, since such an agreement would entail
widespread access by each party to the national computer systems ofother parties
that would be exceptionally intrusive without holding out much promise of
effectiveness.
In 1989, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed not to conduct dangerous military activities in peacetime in proximity to the military forces of the
other party.19 One of the activities in which the parties agreed not to engage is
interference with command and control networks in a manner which could
cause harm to personnel or damage to equipment of the other party. Since electronic interference was already the primary mechanism causing interference
with command and control networks, it would appear that this agreement can
be applied to CNA without change. Whether circumstances will make it appropriate to enter into similar agreements with other nations remains to be seen.
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3. LAw cifWar Agreements. Existing law of war treaties ban the use in international armed conflicts of weapons such as expanding bullets, barbed weapons,
and projectiles filled with glass on the basis that, used as intended, they are likely
to cause unnecessary suffering.2o The methods and means of information warfare do not generally raise such considerations, since few information warfare
techniques cause any direct personal injury or impairment to health. An odd and
isolated exception is a report by Russian authorities that they have discovered a
computer virus called "666" that displays certain light patterns on a computer
screen that cause the operator to lapse into a coma. Fifty computer operators are
reported to have died as a result of exposure to the "666" virus. 21 With this bizarre exception, information warfare "weapons" are not generally understood
to cause unnecessary suffering in the same way as do weapons that have been
banned for this reason.
The law of war also bans the use in international armed conflict of weapons
that are indiscriminate, i.e., they cannot be controlled and directed only against
authorized military targets. Poison gas and non-self-destructinglnon-self-disabling
antipersonnellandmines are examples ofweapons that have been banned for this
reason. 22 We have already seen self-propagating computer "viruses" and
"worms" that clearly foreshadow the issue of malicious logic that runs amok
through military and civilian computer systems. Again, however, malicious
computer logic is unlikely to direcdy cause injury and death. Furthermore, any
attempt at drafting an international agreement that would ban indiscriminate information warfare "weapons" is likely to founder on the difficulty of defining
them. It seems unlikely that any resulting agreement would advance internationallaw beyond the principle that "information weapons," like all weapons,
must be discriminate.
Law of war agreements have also taJs:en the tack of banning or restricting
attacks on certain targets, such as medical facilities, prisoner of war camps, and
cultural property.23 These existing agreements already protect these facilities
from attack by any means, including information warfare techniques. It might
be argued that infrastructures that are heavily relied upon for the health and
safety of the civilian populations and that are particularly vulnerable to CNA
should be specifically protected from such attack by international agreement.
Examples might be public utilities, transportation, communications, financial
networks, emergency services, and universities. The problem is that such systems may in certain circumstances be legitimate targets of attack. This may be
the case when the system is being used to provide direct support to military
operations, as when a single electric power net is used both for military and
civilian purposes. It may also be the case, in a long and protracted conflict,
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that a belligerent's transportation, utilities, financial system, and research and
development systems become valid military targets because disrupting them
would significandy undermine its military strength. Accordingly, it seems unlikely that the nations would agree to bestow blanket immunity on such systems, or that an international agreement could be negotiated that would
advance law of war principles on the targeting of dual-use infrastructures beyond their current state. Furthermore, it would be highly counterproductive
to ban CNA against such infrastructures while leaving them open to attack by
traditional military weapons, which would in most cases create a much greater
danger of collateral damage.
Finally, one theme ofthe Russian initiative for a ban on "especially dangerous
information weapons" has been a push for limitations on psychological warfare.
The Russian statement submitted to the Secretary General inJune 1999 referred
to the threat of"(u)se ofinformation with a view to undermining a State's political and social system; psychological manipulation ofa population for the purpose
of destabilizing society."24 The Cuban submission also addressed this issue:
"The misuse of information and telecommunications systems and information
resources, especially when such systems and resources are used by some States to
carry out their policies ofinterference in the affairs of other States, is an infringement ofthe sovereignty and independence ofthe affected States and creates centres of tension that may pose a serious threat to international security. "25 From
past experience, it seems highly unlikely that the international community ,vill
be eager to create broad restrictions on propaganda, even as it has been empowered by new and more powerful information technologies. Russia, Cuba, and
other States stung in the past by the Voice of America, Radio Marti, and other
"voices offreedom" will no doubt continue to beat this drum. It seems particularly unlikely that any of the Western democracies will support such calls to impose international, legal restraints on the criticism of other societies or
governments. As the authors of a recent article in Foreign Affairs concluded,
"Their societies are familiar with the free exchange ofinformation, and their institutions of governance are not threatened by it. "26

Forms Of Possible Agreements
A. Multilateral Conventions. Multilateral conventions, especially those to
which substantially all nations become parties, carry the greatest weight of
authority in establishing new international law. It seems extremely unlikely,
however, that a multilateral convention restricting State action relating to
information warfare will be adopted anytime soon. As stated above, few nations
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have eJl.."Pressed any interest in negotiating such an agreement, chiefly because
few nations understand information warfare capabilities and vulnerabilities well
enough to determine what principles ofinternational law would best serve their
long-term national interests.
In addition, the fundamental unhappiness felt by many nations as the result of
recent eJl.."Periences in diplomatic conferences is likely to generate significant
procedural controversies that would have to be settled before negotiating new
multilateral conventions. There are essentially two procedural approaches to the
negotiation of a multilateral convention, whether through UN channels or in a
special diplomatic conference. The first is a consensus procedure, which is used
in such fora as the Conference on Disarmament. This procedure requires
achieving general acceptance of a negotiating text, usually by a process of tough
bargaining and compromise.
A recent alternative approach to negotiating multilateral conventions has
been the use of majority-rule procedures, which were in essence the procedures used in the negotiations in Oslo that produced the Ottawa Convention
banning antipersonnellandmines and in the Rome Conference that produced
the draft Statute of the International Criminal Court. The great practical advantage and also the worst defect of such procedures is that they allow the majority of participating nations to approve a treaty text to which minority
nations have fundamental objections. Such a result affords the organizers of
the negotiations and the members of the majority immediate gratification, but
it produces a treaty that will probably not be accepted by the dissenting States.
In the case of the Ottawa Convention, this process generated a treaty which is
almost meaningless because it apparently will not be ratified by a number of
countries whose military forces and operations are most important to world
affairs, including the United States, Russia, and China. The same is true to a
somewhat lesser extent for the draft Statute of the International Criminal
Court. Ironically, there were opportunities in the negotiations that produced
both of these conventions to arrive at compromises that would have made
them more widely acceptable. In both cases, however, the "like-minded"
groups were not required to agree to these compromises to produce an agreement, and in both they chose ideological purity over wider acceptance. With
these recent debacles in mind, it seems unlikely that there will be much enthusiasm in the near future for convening any major new international lawmaking diplomatic conferences on any subject.
B. Bilateral Agreements. Bilateral agreements, or agreements among a small
number of nations, are most useful when only a few governments are directly
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involved in the issues to be addressed. This may be because the issues are limited
to one geographic area, or because only a few nations are capable of engaging in
the activities in question. Good examples of the latter group are strategic nuclear
arms control agreements and agreements to limit anti-ballistic and theater missile
defense systems. Agreements to promote better suppression of cybercrime and
cyberterrorism could be negotiated either multilaterally or bilaterally. The
results of the current efforts described above in the G-8, the Council ofEurope,
and the Organization of American States are likely to be a combination of both,
with regional agreements arrived at on some issues, and bilateral approaches
taken to others. Negotiation ofa global multilateral convention on these issues is
unlikely until the problems of cybercrime and cyberterrorism are more broadly
experienced and more broadly understood.
C. General Assembly Resolutions. The United Nations General Assembly
has displayed great enthusiasm for passing resolutions on a broad range of subjects calling on Member States to adhere to certain principles. When such resolutions enjoy broad support they may persuasively influence the policies of
member governments and international institutions, but such resolutions do
not generally have the force of international law. On the other hand, there are
occasional General Assembly resolutions that are eA-pressly intended to declare
certain principles of customary international law. When such resolutions are
supported by all or substantially all Members, they may be given great weight as
evidence of customary international law. An example of such a resolution recognized as "law-declarative" by the United States is the 1970 Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 27
Judging from the lack of interest generated by the Russian initiatives on "information security" in the General Assembly, it seems unlikely that there will be
enough support to pass any kind of resolution calling on Member States to observe any set of principles concerning information warfare. Given the novelty
of the international legal issues involved, it seems even more unlikely that the
General Assembly will pass a "law-declarative" resolution on information warfare in the next several decades.
D. "Codification" of Existing Customary International Law. Several
participants in the Newport conference recalled the work of the round-tables of
governmental and academic experts that met periodically from 1988 to 1994,
hosted by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, which ultimately
produced the San Remo Manual on International LAw Applicable to Amled Conflicts at
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Sea. The San Remo Manual is widely recognized as an authoritative restatement
of the consensus understanding among the world's leading governmental and
academic experts in this branch of international law, and it will no doubt be
accorded great weight as evidence of the interpretation of applicable treaties and
the state of customary international law. However, there would appear to be
little potential in the foreseeable future for successfully employing an "experts
conference" to authoritatively record the customary international law governing
information warfare. At present there is no such law, which can only accumulate
from State practice in reaction to events as they unfold 'over time. Accordingly,
there are no "experts" either, since there is no accumulation ofState practice that
learned commentators could analyze and restate.

Conclusions
The ne},."t few years are likely to produce a number of regional and bilateral
agreements designed to improve international cooperation in battling
cybercrime and cyberterrorism. If dramatic events occur involving
cyberterrorism, or if the international community feels the necessity to do somethi/lg in the area of computer network attacks, a multilateral convention on suppression of cyberterrorism may result. The parties to strategic arms control
treaties may find it useful to state their common understanding concerning how
their provisions apply to CNA directed against national technical means ofverification, command and control systems, and attack warning systems.
However, there seems to be little or no prospect of negotiating international
agreements that would broadly prohibit or regulate state action involving information warfare techniques because: (1) the issues involved are not yet well understood; (2) traditional arms control and law of war mechanisms are not well
suited for application to CNA; and (3) the nations-including the United
States-do not yet have a clear understanding ofwhat kind ofinternational legal
regime relating to information warfare would best serve their long-term national interests. For the foreseeable future, the development ofinternational law
concerning information warfare is most likely to consist of the incremental accumulation of customary international law resulting from the actions and statements of nations in response to events as they unfold. Considering the
circumstances, that is probably the best available process. During this formative
period, statesmen and their advisers will have a heavy responsibility to bear in
mind that their acts and statements will playa major role in the development of
international law concerning information warfare.
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